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IRAQ: THE WAY OUT
Alon Ben-Meir - August 3, 2007
Dr. ALON BEN-MEIR – His exceptional knowledge and insight gained by more than 25 years of direct involvement with foreign affairs, with a focus on the Middle East, have allowed Dr. Alon Ben-Meir to offer a unique and invaluable perspective on the nature of world terrorism, ethnic conflict, and international negotiations.
A noted journalist and author, Dr. Ben-Meir is the Middle East Director of the World Policy Institute at the New School for Social Research, and a professor of International Relations and Middle-Eastern studies at the Center for Global Studies at NYU and at the New School. Born in Baghdad and currently residing in New York City, he holds a masters degree in philosophy and a doctorate in international relations from Oxford University.
In addition to his essays on contemporary global conflict oriented issues, Dr. Ben-Meir writes a weekly syndicated column about current international policies and events, which is published by United Press International.
Fluent in Arabic and Hebrew, Dr. Ben-Meir began his career as a journalist. His frequent travels to the Mid-East and conversations with highly placed sources in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and Palestine provide him with an exceptionally nuanced level of awareness of and insight into the developments surrounding breaking news.
Dr. Ben-Meir is the author of numerous books, including: The Middle East: Imperative and Choices, Israel: The Challenge of the Fourth Decade, In Defiance of Time, Framework for Arab-Israeli Peace, The Last Option, and A War We Must Win. He expects to publish his latest book Defeating Terrorism in the summer of 2006.
Dr. Ben-Meir's views on contemporary international affairs are often sought out by major television and radio networks, and he is a frequent speaker before groups and organizations at venues as varied as world affairs councils and town hall meetings. He is a popular lecturer on international relations at a variety of universities besides the New York University and the New School.
As Congress debates when and how to withdraw American troops from Iraq, the most
critical question for every single member to answer is: What sort of Iraq will
the United States leave behind? Having torn the country to pieces, destroyed its
social order and brought millions of Iraqis to the point of utter despair
through the Bush administration's tragic misadventure, America has a moral
obligation to help the Iraqi people reconstitute their civil society and restore
their shattered lives.
It is only in this context that the debate in Congress ought to be conducted.
Its focus should not be on whether U.S. troops need to withdraw from Iraq in
three, six, or nine months, or even in a year or two, but what must America do
to help end the horrific civil war in a way that prevents a total disintegration
of Iraqi society, thereby averting a further escalation of violence between the
Sunnis and the Shiites that could rapidly plunge the entire Middle East into
bloody turmoil. Those Democrats - and the several Republicans joining them -
supporting a quick withdrawal are dead wrong in their assessment of what would
be its effects. The likeliest scenario is that it will lead to anarchy in Iraq
and usher in regional war of catastrophic proportions. Meanwhile, Republican
members of Congress who support the president's policy still do not grasp, or
cannot admit so, that nearly five yeas into the war, it has been a dismal
failure.
Regardless of any signs of progress, there is no military solution because no
troop surge can permanently quell the insurgency and end the sectarian violence.
If there is a reduction of violence in and around Baghdad, which is debatable
and in the number of American soldiers killed, it is temporary at best. The
Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias know only too well when to lie low and
how and when to resume and intensify their bloody campaign against each other.
Neither side is exhausted: each in fact is certain it can improve its position
dramatically. Specifically, while the Sunnis continue to believe that they can
regain power once the Americans leave, the Shiites want to consolidate their
hold on power at any cost.
It would be only another great folly if the intent of the surge is to give U.S.
commanders and the Maliki government more time to train and better prepare Iraqi
internal security forces and the military to take over from the Americans. To
begin with, both institutions are Shiite dominated, and the Shiite militias have
effectively penetrated their ranks. Tribal and religious loyalties remain the
driving forces behind their conduct and the administration can do very little to
change socially, culturally, and politically ingrained behavior. On many
occasions, members of the Iraqi security forces have directly participated in
violent attacks against Sunni civilians. There is absolutely no evidence that
the hatred and the deadly rivalry between the two sects that fuel the conflict
will abate, especially when the outcome of their power struggle is undecided and
existential fear of each other is omnipresent.
This brings us to the third fallacy of the administration. The president's
propensity, supported by the vice president, to adopt a strategy based on
wishful thinking. This tendency is currently most apparent in Mr. Bush's efforts
to push the Maliki government to enact laws and take concrete steps toward
political reconciliation with the Sunnis. Meanwhile, just about everyone else of
any influence--Congressional leaders, the American commanders on the ground in
Iraq, and even members of the administration itself--has concluded that the
Maliki government has not delivered. It has failed mainly because the Shiite
political parties, especially the Dawa and the Sciri, are unwilling to
relinquish any of their power that they have captured after decades of
persecution by Saddam Hussein. Maliki is not Nelson Mandela. Forgetting and
forgiving is not in the prime minister's dictionary. Besides, even if Mr. Maliki
decides to take some steps toward political reconciliation, his efforts will be
stymied by hardliners in his party. In his testimony on July 31 before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the nominee for
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that without political
reconciliation, "no amount of troops in no amount of time will make much of
difference." Meanwhile Iraq's largest Sunni political party resigned from the
government dealing another serious blow to any prospect of reconciliation.
Knowing what we now know about Mr. Maliki and the rivalries between the Shiite
political parties and their militias, one might then ask where the
administration's optimism comes from.
Given this situation, what course is open to Congress? A new strategy is needed,
and at its center is the creation of a self-ruled Sunni entity, which I
advocated here more than four years ago. The United States must persuade the
Sunnis to establish self-rule in their three Sunni dominated provinces, and
Congress must provide them with the initial economic assistance and military
means and equipment for self-protection. In the interim, the United States must
bring all the necessary pressure to bear on the Maliki government (including the
threat to remove him from power) to pass the oil law, which is necessary for the
long-term economic viability of any Sunni entity.
In time, perhaps 10 to 15 years, as the three separate entities--Kurdish, Sunni,
and Shiite-each run their lives as they see fit, with somewhat loose federal
ties, they will, of necessity, gravitate toward one another and begin to
reconcile their differences and grievances. The sooner the administration and
Congress adopt policies encouraging this end, the sooner the carnage in Iraq
will end. With it, the potential for regional conflagration will diminish, and
U.S. troops can then withdraw with some dignity. That much America owes the
Iraqi people.
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