What Migration Has Cost and Contributed
Europe’s governments and statistics offices measure who works, who is poor and what each group pays in and takes out. Read together, their figures show where migration has strained public budgets and where it has paid its way.
Country map · Work · Poverty · Denmark’s ledger · Across the OECD · Method
Five findings
- Fewer at work. In 2025, 65.0% of non-EU citizens aged 20 to 64 in the EU had a job, against 77.0% of citizens of the country they lived in.
- The gap is closing. In 2015 the difference was 13.6 points. By 2025 it was 12.0.
- More than twice as likely to be poor. 36.5% of non-EU citizens of working age were at risk of poverty in 2025, against 13.4% of nationals.
- Origin and reason for coming matter. In Denmark, immigrants from Western countries paid in more than they received; immigrants and descendants from the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey cost the state 24 billion kroner net in 2018.
- Work is what decides it. Denmark, the OECD and Britain’s fiscal watchdog reach the same conclusion: migrants in work, and in better-paid work, contribute; those outside work cost.
Work: the employment gap
Employment is the single biggest driver of whether a group pays in more than it takes out. Across the EU the share of non-EU citizens in work rose from 56.0% in 2015 to 65.0% in 2025, with a dip in 2020 during the pandemic, but it remains well below that of nationals.
Citizens of the country Citizens of countries outside the EU
Share of people aged 20 to 64 in employment. Eurostat, employment rates by citizenship
Percentage points between the employment rate of nationals and of non-EU citizens. Countries with a published figure for both groups in 2025. Eurostat
Poverty
Lower employment shows up in household income. Non-EU citizens of working age are far more likely than nationals to live on less than 60 percent of their country’s median income, the EU’s definition of being at risk of poverty.
Citizens of the country Citizens of countries outside the EU
Bars are drawn on a 0–60% scale. Eurostat, at-risk-of-poverty rate by citizenship
Denmark’s ledger
Denmark’s Finance Ministry is one of the few governments that calculates, from its own tax and benefit registers, what each origin group pays in and receives. Its October 2021 analysis covers 2018.
- 31 billion kroner was the net cost to public finances of immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries in 2018, two billion less than in 2017.
- 24 billion of that came from people with roots in the MENAPT countries: the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey.
- 7 billion kroner was the net contribution of immigrants and descendants from Western countries.
- 9.4 billion kroner was the net contribution of immigrants who came to work, including family members who came with them.
- 35 percent of MENAPT immigrants aged 25 to 64 contributed more than they received, against 53 percent of immigrants from other non-Western countries.
Thousand kroner per person, in 2018 prices. Taxes paid minus benefits and public services received. Finance Ministry, table 2.1
Immigrants and descendants combined, billion kroner in 2018 prices. The cost peaked in 2015, the year of the largest asylum intake, and has fallen since. Finance Ministry, table 2.1
What the ledger shows
The ministry’s figures separate people by why they came as well as where they came from. Those who came on a work permit contributed on average, and so did people in paid employment whatever their reason for coming. The ministry notes that the non-Western groups include refugees, people who came through family reunification and people who came to work, which is why results within them vary so widely. Finance Ministry analysis
Across the OECD and in Britain
Small on average, large in places. The OECD estimated the net fiscal position of immigrants in 25 countries between 2006 and 2018. In most of them the total effect stayed between −1% and +1% of national income. It found that closing the employment gap with natives of the same age, sex and education would raise immigrants’ net contribution by more than a third of a percentage point of GDP in about three in ten countries. OECD, International Migration Outlook 2021
Wages decide the lifetime balance. Britain’s Office for Budget Responsibility modelled the lifetime fiscal effect of a migrant arriving at 25. A low-wage migrant had a negative lifetime impact; a high-wage migrant had a positive one. Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, summarising the OBR
Method
Employment and poverty figures compare people by citizenship, not by country of birth. Naturalised immigrants count as nationals, so the gaps shown understate differences between people born abroad and those born in the country. Danish figures use the government’s own categories of origin and are in 2018 prices. No figure on this page measures crime or public safety, or describes any individual.