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Investigations · United States

After Aliquippa: A Hacked Water Pump, Six Sanctioned Officers and a Bill Nobody Owns

By Researchez Investigations · Published · 8 min read

In November 2023, a group calling itself CyberAv3ngers took over a pressure pump in western Pennsylvania through a controller with a weak password. Washington blames Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and has sanctioned six officers. The local damage was put at $20,000. The cost of securing thousands of small water systems still has no owner.

In 60 seconds

In November 2023, hackers took over a water pressure pump in Aliquippa, a small Pennsylvania town, through a controller that still had an easy password. Staff ran the pump by hand and nobody’s water was unsafe. U.S. agencies say the hackers were a front for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and Washington sanctioned six officers. The local damage was put at $20,000. Small water systems pay for their own security out of residents’ water bills, and federal help has been small.

Key points

  • On November 25, 2023, attackers took control of a pressure booster station of the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania; staff ran it by hand and the water stayed safe.
  • Seven agencies call CyberAv3ngers “an Iranian IRGC-affiliated cyber persona.” The U.S. Treasury sanctioned six Revolutionary Guards cyber officials in February 2024, and the State Department offers up to $10 million for information. Government-attributed
  • The campaign reached at least 75 devices, including at least 34 in U.S. water and wastewater systems, mostly through default or missing passwords.
  • The only published local cost is $20,000 in damage, without a breakdown. Federal water cybersecurity funding has been a small fraction of what Congress authorized.

On Saturday, November 25, 2023, a pump at a booster station in western Pennsylvania stopped doing what it was told. The station, run by the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa, regulates water pressure for Raccoon and Potter townships. Its controller now displayed a message: “You have been hacked, down with Israel.” An alarm went off, and staff took over by hand. “The booster system did what it was supposed to,” the authority’s chairman, Matthew Mottes, told Government Technology. “It sent an alarm and we took control manually. Nobody was ever at risk.”

The name on the screen was CyberAv3ngers. Mottes confirmed to KDKA-TV that the group had taken control of one of the stations. The device was made by Unitronics, an Israeli company, and the station sat “on its own computer network, separated from our primary network and is physically miles away,” Mottes told the security firm Claroty. The water stayed safe to drink.

It was a small station in a small authority. Within weeks, agencies of seven governments had described the group behind it as a front for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and in February Washington sanctioned the officers it holds responsible. What none of those documents settles is who pays when a part that costs little to secure is left open on the internet, in many places at once.

AliquippaGovernment Technology, November 29, 2023CBS Pittsburgh (KDKA)Claroty Team82WaterISAC advisory

The same screen in other places

Three days after the Aliquippa hack, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued an alert about the exploitation of Unitronics controllers in water and wastewater systems. It described “a U.S. water facility” that “immediately took the system offline and switched to manual operations,” with “no known risk to the municipality’s drinking water.” The alert did not name the town.

The joint advisory that followed, AA23-335A, set out the method. The actors were “likely” compromising internet-facing devices that had default passwords or none at all. The advisory, last revised on December 18, 2024, says the actors “compromised at least 75 devices, including at least 34 in the WWS Sector in the United States,” from November 2023 to January 2024, in what were “likely” four separate waves. Mottes told the Associated Press that federal officials had told him the same group breached four other utilities and an aquarium. None of the others has been publicly named.

In Ireland, about 160 households in Erris, County Mayo, lost water for two days at the end of November 2023. Ireland’s Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications told The Record that the outage “was as a result of the exploitation of a vulnerability in a particular type of programmable logic controller,” and that there was “no suggestion that services in Ireland were specifically targeted.” Whether the same group was responsible has not been established; SecurityWeek noted it was “unclear if this group is behind the attack.”

The wider campaignCISA alert, November 28, 2023CISA and partners, advisory AA23-335AAP, November 30, 2023The Record on ErrisSecurityWeek on Erris

Who says who did it

Seven agencies signed AA23-335A: the FBI, CISA, the NSA, the Environmental Protection Agency, Israel’s National Cyber Directorate, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre. They describe CyberAv3ngers as “an Iranian IRGC-affiliated cyber persona.” The advisory also warns that some of the group’s own claims about attacks in Israel “are false,” a reminder that a claim posted online is not evidence.

On February 2, 2024, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned six officials of the Revolutionary Guards’ Cyber-Electronic Command, which it describes as the Iranian government organization responsible. The list begins with the command’s head, Hamid Reza Lashgarian, and includes Mahdi Lashgarian. Treasury was careful about the damage: “this particular operation did not disrupt any critical services,” it said, adding that the incidents were “quickly remediated” with “minimal impacts.”

The State Department’s Rewards for Justice program offers up to $10 million for information on the people behind CyberAv3ngers, naming six men, among them both Lashgarians. The Record dated the offer to August 8, 2024. No indictment of the group or of the six officials was found on the Justice Department’s site. No Iranian statement addressing Aliquippa or CyberAv3ngers by name was found; in March 2024, Iran’s mission to the United Nations did not return a message seeking comment on attacks on U.S. water systems, according to the AP.

The two Lashgarians appear again in a later case. In November 2026, France named them among the officers it holds responsible for the attack on refrigeration systems in about 700 French stores, reported in [The Blockade Inside](article-blockade-inside.html). The Pennsylvania station is where the alias first surfaced on American equipment.

AttributionU.S. Treasury, February 2, 2024Rewards for Justice, CyberAv3ngersThe Record, August 8, 2024AP via Insurance Journal, March 21, 2024

Pennsylvania asks, Washington debates

The response began with the police and with letters. The Pennsylvania State Police opened an investigation, according to an advisory from the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which described the device as a Unitronics V570 and said the system “is being operated manually.” On November 30, 2023, Senators John Fetterman and Bob Casey and Representative Chris Deluzio released a letter to Attorney General Merrick Garland. “If a hack like this can happen here in western Pennsylvania, it can happen anywhere else in the United States,” they wrote, the AP reported.

The scale of the exposure was visible to anyone who looked. Claroty’s researchers counted close to 2,000 Unitronics devices reachable from the internet through the Shodan search engine, they wrote in their analysis. Each was a possible target for anyone who knew the default password.

In Washington, the question quickly became one of rules and money. A March 2023 EPA rule requiring states to audit water systems’ cybersecurity was suspended by an appeals court after a challenge by Arkansas, Iowa and Missouri, and withdrawn in October 2023, the AP reported. Those states argued that strapped systems would pass the costs on to consumers, City & State Pennsylvania wrote. At the House hearing in January 2024, Deluzio said: “Thankfully, the attack did not interrupt my constituents’ water service or compromise their personal information.”

The private sector offered some help. Robert M. Lee, chief executive of the industrial security firm Dragos, told the AP that Aliquippa’s story “is tens of thousands of utilities across the country,” and his company offers free software and support to utilities with under $100 million in revenue, the AP reported. Help of that kind depends on a utility knowing it needs it.

Pennsylvania and WashingtonWaterISAC advisory, November 27, 2023AP, November 30, 2023Claroty Team82City & State PA, February 7, 2024AP via SecurityWeek, January 2, 2024

A fix that was already available

The weakness was not exotic. In December 2023, CISA published an industrial control systems advisory for the Unitronics Vision and Samba series, CVE-2023-6448, scored 9.8 out of 10. “Unitronics has patched this vulnerability in VisiLogic version 9.9.00 and recommends all users update to the latest version,” it said. The joint advisory had already told operators to change default passwords and take controllers off the open internet.

Months later, the regulator found that many systems had not done the basics. In a May 2024 enforcement alert, the EPA said “over 70% of the systems inspected by EPA since September 2023 are in violation of basic SDWA Section 1433 requirements,” and that “some water systems failed to change default passwords.” In March 2024 the EPA administrator and the national security adviser wrote to every governor that “disabling cyberattacks are striking water and wastewater systems throughout the United States,” the AP reported.

In November 2024, the EPA’s inspector general published a scan of the country’s larger drinking water systems: 97 systems “serving approximately 26.6 million users” had critical or high-risk vulnerabilities, and the agency “does not have its own cybersecurity incident reporting system.” The scan covered 1,062 systems, each serving 50,000 people or more. Aliquippa, by the AP’s count, serves about 22,000, too small to be in it.

The fix and the regulatorCISA ICS advisory ICSA-23-348-15EPA enforcement alert, May 2024EPA Office of Inspector General, November 13, 2024

The bill

The only figure published for Aliquippa is small. The Beaver Countian, a local news site, reported on January 2, 2024 that the attack caused $20,000 in damage, citing officials it did not name. No breakdown was published: not how much went to equipment, how long staff ran the station by hand, or whether insurance paid. CNN reported that the authority decided to replace the Israeli-made equipment as a precaution; that report could not be opened for this article.

The larger cost is what the incident revealed. The authority “had never had outside help with cybersecurity,” the AP found, and it was building a new treatment plant costing $18.5 million to replace one dating to the 1930s. “The Aliquippa water and sewer authority? They don’t have the money,” said Rob Matzie, a Democratic state representative, who found no existing funding source for its cybersecurity and was drafting legislation to create one. Opponents of proposed state rules in Maryland and Pennsylvania argued that new security costs would fall on public authorities and their ratepayers.

At the federal level, the money has been thin. At a House hearing on January 31, 2024, water industry witnesses said Congress had authorized $250 million over five years for a water cybersecurity program but had appropriated $5 million, according to GovInfoSecurity. “Most rural utilities lack the financial resources and in-house expertise to defend themselves,” said Rick Jeffares of the Georgia Rural Water Association. The Government Accountability Office reported in August 2024 that “improving cybersecurity is voluntary” for much of the sector and urged the EPA to adopt a national strategy (GAO-24-106744).

Who should pay is a policy question this article does not answer. What the record shows is where the bill lands today. A small authority’s security is paid from its rates, by the households it serves. Federal grants exist, but utilities compete for them with hospitals, police and schools, the AP reported. The officers Washington named face sanctions and a reward offer; neither has paid for anyone’s repairs.

The billBeaver Countian, January 2, 2024AP via SecurityWeek, January 2, 2024GovInfoSecurity on the House hearingGAO-24-106744City & State PA, February 7, 2024

What remains open

The public record does not say how long the Aliquippa station ran by hand, when it returned to automatic control, whether the controller was replaced, or what the $20,000 figure covers. It does not name the other utilities the group reached, or show that the Irish outage was its work. It contains no indictment, and no Iranian response to this campaign.

It does show the sequence. A device with a factory password was reachable from the internet. Someone changed what it displayed and stopped a pump. An alarm worked, and staff at a small authority went out and ran the station themselves. “If you told me to list 10 things that would go wrong with our water authority, this would not be on the list,” Mottes told the AP. The pressure held because someone was there to work the pump.

What is established, and what is not

Established

  • The Aliquippa station was taken over on November 25, 2023, and run manually; the water stayed safe.
  • Seven agencies attribute CyberAv3ngers to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Government-attributed
  • Treasury sanctioned six IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command officials on February 2, 2024, saying the operation did not disrupt critical services.
  • At least 75 devices were compromised, at least 34 in U.S. water and wastewater systems.

Not established

  • How long the station ran by hand, and what the $20,000 figure covers.
  • Whether the Aliquippa controller was replaced (reported by CNN; the report could not be opened).
  • Which other utilities were reached. None has been publicly named.
  • Whether the Irish outage in Erris was the same group’s work.
  • Any indictment, and any Iranian response to this campaign.

Sources

  1. Aliquippa
    1. Government Technology, November 29, 2023
    2. CBS Pittsburgh (KDKA)
    3. Claroty Team82
    4. WaterISAC advisory
  2. The wider campaign
    1. CISA alert, November 28, 2023
    2. CISA and partners, advisory AA23-335A
    3. AP, November 30, 2023
    4. The Record on Erris
    5. SecurityWeek on Erris
  3. Attribution
    1. U.S. Treasury, February 2, 2024
    2. Rewards for Justice, CyberAv3ngers
    3. The Record, August 8, 2024
    4. AP via Insurance Journal, March 21, 2024
  4. Pennsylvania and Washington
    1. WaterISAC advisory, November 27, 2023
    2. AP, November 30, 2023
    3. Claroty Team82
    4. City & State PA, February 7, 2024
    5. AP via SecurityWeek, January 2, 2024
  5. The fix and the regulator
    1. CISA ICS advisory ICSA-23-348-15
    2. EPA enforcement alert, May 2024
    3. EPA Office of Inspector General, November 13, 2024
  6. The bill
    1. Beaver Countian, January 2, 2024
    2. AP via SecurityWeek, January 2, 2024
    3. GovInfoSecurity on the House hearing
    4. GAO-24-106744
    5. City & State PA, February 7, 2024
For journalists and researchers

Key facts, citable

  1. A booster station of the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa was taken over on November 25, 2023, and switched to manual control. Source
  2. Advisory AA23-335A (revised December 18, 2024) says the actors compromised at least 75 devices, including at least 34 in U.S. water and wastewater systems. Source
  3. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned six IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command officials on February 2, 2024. Source
  4. The State Department offers up to $10 million for information on CyberAv3ngers. Source
  5. The EPA said over 70% of systems inspected since September 2023 violated basic Section 1433 requirements. Source

Primary documents

Cite this

Researchez. “After Aliquippa: A Hacked Water Pump, Six Sanctioned Officers and a Bill Nobody Owns.” Researchez, November 20, 2026. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-after-aliquippa-water-controllers.

Researchez. (2026, November 20). After Aliquippa: A Hacked Water Pump, Six Sanctioned Officers and a Bill Nobody Owns. Researchez. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-after-aliquippa-water-controllers

https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-after-aliquippa-water-controllers

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