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Corporate Targets · Espionage & insiders · 60 of 60

He Had Access to ASML and NXP. A Dutch Court Found He Used It to Send Technology to Russia.

A former employee received a three-year sentence in 2025 for computer intrusion and prohibited technical assistance. A 2026 prosecution account describes the conviction as final; payment for the information was not proved.

The files did not have to disappear from ASML or NXP for the companies to lose control over them. A former employee copied technical information from their systems, kept material on devices at home and shared knowledge with a contact in Russia. The employers could still possess their own copies while someone outside the companies acquired the information.

That is the corporate injury at the center of a Rotterdam court decision announced July 10, 2025. The court sentenced a 43-year-old man to three years for computer intrusion and breaching European Union sanctions through technical assistance. It found that the information supplied to Russia concerned establishing microchip production lines. It did not find that he was paid for the transfer.

Reuters identified the defendant as German Aksenov, a former employee of both companies. NXP told the news agency it had cooperated with prosecutors. ASML declined comment, citing litigation. Aksenov denied being a spy and maintained that he retained confidential documents to preserve his professional knowledge. Prosecutors had initially made broader allegations, including selling manuals and contacting Russia’s security service; those allegations should not be substituted for the offenses the court established.

The judges found repeated access outside his duties and retention after employment. They could not date every login. In a technical business, that distinction matters: being able to open a database does not grant permission for every use of it.

In a January 2026 analysis, the Dutch firm Louwers Advocaten examined the case’s treatment of digital information. It noted that the court acquitted the employee of embezzlement because copying files did not deprive the employer of possession of a qualifying physical good. That did not prevent a conviction for computer intrusion. The legal problem was unauthorized use of the systems and the prohibited transfer, rather than the disappearance of an original document.

This distinction gives the episode significance beyond one sentencing outcome. A company may detect a missing object quickly. A duplicated engineering file can leave the original where it was, preserving ordinary operations while removing the company’s exclusive control over knowledge. That does not establish a measurable competitive loss or show that a Russian chip factory was completed using these particular files.

A 2026 interview published by the Dutch prosecution service adds a later procedural development. Prosecutor Astrid Dingley described the ASML-NXP matter as a conviction that had become final. It updates the initial Reuters account, which said in July 2025 that an appeal could still be filed. Finality concerns the conviction, not a new allegation of a later transfer.

The prosecution discussion also explains why export restrictions encompass knowledge as well as equipment. Preventing access to sensitive technology cannot depend only on intercepting a shipment of machines. Advice and production information can have value for a recipient trying to develop its own industrial capability. That explains the sanctions dimension without establishing that the convicted man had a proven intelligence-service contract.

ASML’s 2025 annual report, published in 2026, describes insider risk as a business problem alongside external cyberattacks. It says employee or partner misconduct and mistakes have caused unauthorized access, breaches and loss of information. The company also identifies potential competitive disadvantage, export-control exposure and recovery costs. These are broader corporate disclosures, not an admission that every listed consequence occurred in Aksenov’s case.

The sentence ultimately rested on a narrower, documented chain: company systems, improperly obtained information and prohibited assistance to a person in Russia. The absence of a proved payment did not undo it. Nor did the employers’ continued possession of the original files. Their information could be taken in the commercially consequential sense without a single original vanishing from a server.

Compiled November 16, 2026. Records and findings keep the dates stated in their sources; each link in the text opens the document it relies on.