
The “Russian Group” Behind Disney’s Slack Leak Was a California Man
An employee’s personal computer became a route into corporate communications. A 2026 prison sentence completed the criminal case’s central reversal: the foreign hacktivist identity was a fabrication.
The stolen information belonged to Disney. The computer first compromised did not. That separation sits at the center of the criminal case against Ryan Mitchell Kramer, who reached the entertainment company’s internal Slack communications through credentials taken from an employee’s personal digital life.
In early 2024, Kramer placed software online that purported to generate artificial-intelligence art but contained a malicious file. A Disney employee downloaded it. Kramer obtained access to the employee’s computer and an account storing personal and work credentials, then used the employee’s Slack access to download approximately 1.1 terabytes from thousands of non-public company channels. These were admissions in an executed plea agreement, not simply claims posted by an anonymous hacker.
In July 2024, Kramer threatened the employee under the invented identity of a Russia-based group, NullBulge. On July 12, after receiving no response, he published the corporate files and the employee’s private information. He also admitted reaching at least two other victims through the malicious download.
The Justice Department’s May 2025 account identified the supposed Russian collective as a fabrication. A Santa Clarita man, rather than the foreign group advertised to the victim, had carried out the operation.
The criminal charging document also separates theft from extortion. The two-count information alleged unauthorized computer access to obtain non-public Disney records and communications, and a separate threat intended to extort money or other value from the employee. It put the information’s value above $5,000, the legal threshold relevant to the charge. That figure was not an estimate of the company’s entire response cost, a ransom paid or a cap on the consequences of publication.
For Disney, the breach created a corporate information problem extending well beyond one account. The records being copied were conversations and files accumulated through work. The route described in the plea does not establish that Slack’s underlying platform was itself exploited. It establishes that access available through an employee account could carry a personal-device compromise into a company’s collaboration environment.
There was a reported operational response. In September 2024, Reuters described a planned move away from Slack, citing reporting on a message from chief financial officer Hugh Johnston. Many teams were already transitioning to other tools, according to that account. Disney and Slack did not immediately respond to Reuters, and the report described a plan rather than a verified audit that every division had completed migration. Disney had acknowledged investigating an unauthorized release from one of its communications systems.
Employees also brought civil claims. A 2024 complaint in Margel v. Disney alleged exposure of employee identification and employment-related information and challenged the company’s notification and safeguards. Those were plaintiffs’ allegations against the corporation, a different legal question from whether Kramer committed the intrusion. A criminal admission establishes the attacker’s conduct; it does not automatically establish every claimed failure by the victim company.
By May 2026, the criminal case had reached sentencing. City News Service reported that Kramer, then 26, received fifteen months in prison after pleading guilty the previous year. The republished federal docket records fifteen months on each count, served concurrently, followed by two years of supervised release. Concurrent terms mean fifteen months, not thirty. A later entry records the July16 vacatur of a restitution hearing; that entry should not be read as evidence that Disney’s losses were reimbursed.
The court record gave the operation an accountable individual. It could punish him, but it could not make the published corporate files confidential again. That leaves a practical challenge for an employer: work access can travel with employees into personal tools whose safeguards the company does not directly control. For Disney, the security boundary had extended beyond company-owned devices to the place where an employee kept the keys to work.
Compiled November 16, 2026. Records and findings keep the dates stated in their sources; each link in the text opens the document it relies on.