
Salt Typhoon Reached America’s Telecom Companies. The Fight Over Their Defenses Followed.
The Salt Typhoon espionage operation reached American telecommunications companies. Regulators then interpreted an existing law as imposing cybersecurity duties—and later reversed that interpretation. The dispute concerns the power to require protection for a system entrusted with the public’s communications.
In April 2025, the FBI sought tips from the public about Chinese activity targeting American telecommunications companies. Its notice distinguished between call records, a limited amount of private communications involving identified victims, and certain information related to court-authorized law-enforcement requests. Those distinctions reveal both the depth of the access and the boundaries of what had been disclosed.
A call record can show who contacted whom and when without revealing the conversation. The contents of private communications expose a different layer. Access to information connected with law enforcement adds a third sensitivity. The FBI described compromises of several types of information, on different scales, inside a major infrastructure system.
The activity, known as Salt Typhoon, turned the companies connecting people into a possible gateway to their lives. Customers can choose which app to use for a conversation, but some information about their communications is generated and stored in infrastructure they do not manage. Protection therefore becomes more than a contest between a security team and an attacker. It becomes a question of what a regulator can require from the operator.
In February 2025, Cisco Talos, the networking equipment manufacturer’s research group, reported the use of valid credentials in most of the cases it had examined. It found no new Cisco vulnerability in those cases; in one, there was evidence of likely exploitation of an older vulnerability. Another involved access lasting more than three years. Those findings apply to the cases the company investigated, but they show why defense involves more than installing a patch for a single new flaw.
AT&T and Verizon said in December 2024 that the activity detected in their networks had been contained. Verizon said an outside security company had also confirmed containment. Those statements gave the public an account of conditions at that time without releasing the full forensic record.
Two Models of Responsibility
In January 2025, the Federal Communications Commission interpreted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or CALEA, as imposing certain cybersecurity requirements. The law addresses, among other things, carriers’ ability to provide lawful access for law enforcement. The action sought to ground a duty of protection in that law and accompanied a proposal for additional rules.
In November that year, the FCC changed course. In FCC 25-81, it rescinded the interpretation and withdrew the proposed rules, for which a comment period had not opened. The majority argued that the earlier action exceeded the agency’s legal authority and that cooperation with carriers, alongside targeted enforcement, would provide better protection.
The commission pointed to steps the carriers had agreed to pursue: faster security updates, reviews of access permissions, reductions in unnecessary outbound connections and threat hunting. These were industry commitments and measures. The dispute was whether they could suffice without a binding mechanism of the kind previously attempted.
Commissioner Anna Gomez dissented. She called for enforceable accountability, goals and measures of progress. The disagreement was not over whether security was necessary; both sides invoked it. It concerned the power to require action and assess performance when the interests of a company, a customer and the state do not always align.
In July 2026, GAO determined that the FCC’s rescission was a rule subject to submission to Congress under the Congressional Review Act. The decision addressed the action’s status and the process applicable to it. It did not itself restore the rescinded interpretation or provide experimental evidence establishing which model prevented more intrusions.
The espionage that prompted the debate preceded the rescission. That intrusion therefore cannot be attributed to the later reversal. The sequence moved the discussion from an intrusion that had already occurred to the authority to require changes and verify that they had been made.
For a telephone subscriber, the argument takes place far from the device in hand. Subscribers do not choose administrator privileges on the network or receive its investigative reports. Their information nevertheless passes through it. What telecommunications companies must do to protect that information remains part of the service, even when it does not appear on the monthly bill.
Compiled November 16, 2026. Records and findings keep the dates stated in their sources; each link in the text opens the document it relies on.