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Investigations · Denmark

Twenty-Two Companies in Two Weeks: Denmark’s Largest Energy Hack, and What Its Investigators Would Not Say

By Researchez Investigations · Published · 9 min read

In May 2023, attackers broke into 22 Danish energy companies through firewall flaws, and some plants ran cut off from the network for days. The sector’s own security center found signs of a state actor but no evidence to blame Russia. No government has named anyone, and no one has published the cost.

In 60 seconds

In May 2023, hackers broke into 22 Danish energy companies through a flaw in a common brand of firewall. Some companies had to cut their plants off from the internet and run them locally, one for six days. Nobody lost power or heat. The sector’s own security center found signs that a state might have been involved but said there was no evidence to blame Russia, and no government has named anyone since. Some companies had not installed the fix because their supplier charged for it. What the attacks cost has never been published.

Key points

  • Between May 11 and late May 2023, attackers compromised 22 companies that operate parts of Denmark’s energy infrastructure through flaws in Zyxel firewalls. Several went into island mode; one ran that way for six days. Households kept power and heat.
  • The attackers hit all 16 first-wave targets they chose among SektorCERT’s 300 members, and nobody has explained how they knew which were vulnerable.
  • Some members had skipped the patch because the supplier charged to install it. It is the report’s only reference to money.
  • SektorCERT found “indications” of a state actor but “no evidence to accuse Russia.” No government has attributed the attacks, no company has been named and no cost has been published.

On May 11, 2023, sensors run by SektorCERT, the security center that Danish critical infrastructure companies own and fund, picked up something its analysts had not seen before: one attack aimed at 16 energy companies at the same time. Each target sat behind a firewall made by Zyxel. Each firewall carried a flaw the manufacturer had disclosed two weeks earlier, on April 25. Exploiting it was, as the center later put it in its report, “an attack that could be performed by sending a single packet towards the device.”

Eleven companies “were compromised immediately,” the report says. The attackers had control of their firewalls and, behind them, access to industrial systems that run parts of the Danish power and heating supply. At the other five, the commands did not complete, “possibly because the packets sent were incorrectly formatted.” SektorCERT, the report notes, “currently does not have the staff to respond to attacks outside normal working hours.” The team stayed on anyway, and all eleven companies were secured through the afternoon, evening and night. Then, it writes, “for the next 10 days there was silence from the attackers.”

By the end of May, 22 companies that operate parts of Danish energy infrastructure had been compromised in what the report calls the most extensive cyber attack Denmark had experienced. Several had to cut themselves off and run in “island mode.” One ran that way for six days. The lights stayed on. Three and a half years later, no government has said who did it, no company has been named, and no one has published what it cost.

May 11, 2023SektorCERT, The attack against Danish, critical infrastructure, November 2023SektorCERT, Danish editionDR, November 12, 2023

They knew where to aim

The first thing that unsettled the investigators was precision. SektorCERT says it could find nothing in its own data to show how the attackers had identified which members were vulnerable. “To this day, there is no clear explanation of how the attackers had the necessary information,” the report says, “but we can state that among the 300 members, they did not miss a single shot.”

The second was why so many firewalls were still open. A patch had been out since April 25, and SektorCERT says it sent members an extra warning on May 1 (SektorCERT, 2026). Its report lists the reasons the update had not been installed. Some members believed a new firewall must already have the latest software. Others assumed their vendor was responsible for updates. Some did not know they had the device at all. And “other members had deliberately opted out of the updates as there was a cost from the supplier to install them (the software itself is free).” That sentence is the only reference to money in the 32-page report.

Closing a hole like this is not free in another sense. To patch a firewall at a company that supplies critical infrastructure, “you have to disconnect from the internet for some time, and that can disrupt production,” SektorCERT’s chief executive told DR, the Danish public broadcaster, after the report came out. A security expert quoted in the same piece said: “We are lucky that it did not end completely badly.” (Quotations from Danish-language sources in this article are Researchez translations.)

Why the firewalls were openSektorCERT report, pages 9 and 10SektorCERT, Poland report, October 2026DR, November 14, 2023

The second wave

On May 22 the attacks began again, and this time they looked different. At one member, the firewall downloaded new software and began to behave as if it were part of Mirai, a known botnet, taking part in denial-of-service attacks against a target in Hong Kong and another in the United States. On SektorCERT’s advice, the member shut down its internet connection and went into island operation. A second member followed that evening, and its firewall was later replaced entirely.

On May 24, Zyxel announced two more critical flaws, CVE-2023-33009 and CVE-2023-33010. SektorCERT says these were unknown at the time of the May 22 attack and that “the attackers possibly knew about the vulnerabilities before they were announced.” The same day, over a period of 17 minutes, three more members were compromised with a payload called MIPSkiller, and their firewalls were used to attack other targets. One was overloaded and stopped working.

That evening, the sensors caught a member’s firewall sending traffic to an address the report says belonged to the Sandworm group, a unit of Russian military intelligence. In the night between May 24 and 25, another member was hit, and again a single packet went to “another suspected Sandworm server.” That member chose to order a new firewall from its supplier, the report says, “and therefore ended up running in island operation for 6 days as a consequence.” At noon on May 25, SektorCERT contacted the police’s National Center for Cybercrime and the Center for Cyber Security.

After the flaw was publicized more widely at the end of May, attempts against Danish infrastructure “exploded,” especially from addresses in Poland and Ukraine. SektorCERT counted “around 200,000 attack attempts per day” against the first vulnerability across its members.

The second waveSektorCERT report, timeline, pages 12 to 26

What “island mode” means for a household

Island operation means a plant runs without its connection to the outside network, so that the compromised link cannot be used to reach the systems that control production. The affected companies “were forced to disconnect the affected systems from the internet to contain the possible damage,” DR reported. The attacks “did not affect the companies’ customers.”

SektorCERT itself describes the episode as “a completely invisible incident for the Danes, who still had electricity and heat in their homes.” DR reported that in the worst case, more than 100,000 Danes could have been left without power or heat. That figure does not appear in the report. It describes what did not happen, not what did.

Island modeDR, November 12, 2023SektorCERT report, page 11

Who did it: what the report says, and what it will not say

The report is unusually careful about its own limits. It separates a timeline, described as “objective,” from an analysis section, about which it says: “This part of the report is subjective and we may be wrong in our assessments.”

In the analysis, SektorCERT writes that “there are indications that a state actor may have been involved in one or more attacks,” and that “we are mostly inclined to believe that there were two different attack groups based on the ’style’ of the attacks.” On Sandworm it goes no further than this: “Whether Sandworm was involved in the attack cannot be said with certainty. Individual indicators of this have been observed, but we have no opportunity to neither confirm nor deny it.” It concludes: “There is therefore no evidence to accuse Russia of being involved in the attack.” And it draws a line around its own role: “it is outside SektorCERT’s area of responsibility to consider any geopolitical consequences of this.”

The authorities said little more. Mark Fiedel, head of cyber analysis at the Center for Cyber Security, told TV 2 that the attacks “fall entirely within the framework of what we describe in our threat assessments.” He confirmed to DR that the center had been involved in the reported case but could say no more, because there were still lines of investigation to pursue.

In January 2024, the security firm Forescout challenged the picture of a single campaign. Its evidence, it said, “suggests that the two waves of attacks on Danish infrastructure reported by SektorCERT … were unrelated,” and that the second wave “was simply part of a mass exploitation campaign against unpatched firewalls, not part of a targeted attack by Sandworm or another state-sponsored actor.” It agreed that the first wave suggested “a potentially targeted attack.” Forescout counted more than 43,000 Zyxel firewalls exposed online, most of them in Europe.

No government has attributed the May 2023 attacks. Danish authorities have since attributed other incidents. In December 2025, Denmark’s Defence Intelligence Service said a destructive attack on a water utility was carried out by the pro-Russia group Z-Pentest, which it said “has connections to the Russian state” (Security Affairs, quoting the service). In July 2026, the United Kingdom and EU member states attributed a December 2025 attack on Poland’s energy grid to Russia’s FSB Centre 16 (UK government). SektorCERT’s own report on Poland, published in October 2026, asks whether May 2023 was a Danish warning, and answers: “Not because the attribution was the same, but because the pattern was” (SektorCERT, translated).

AttributionSektorCERT report, pages 3, 8, 11, 16, 18TV 2, November 12, 2023DR, November 12, 2023Forescout, January 2024Security Affairs, December 20, 2025UK government, July 13, 2026SektorCERT, Poland report, October 2026

The bill nobody published

No recovery cost for the May 2023 attacks has been published by the companies, SektorCERT, the Danish Energy Agency or any ministry. The companies are not named, so their accounts cannot be checked. What is documented is who carried the response. SektorCERT describes itself as “a non-profit organisation owned and funded by Danish critical infrastructure companies.” The analysts who worked through the night, the replacement firewalls and the days of manual operation were paid for inside the sector, and the sector is paid for by energy customers.

The wider costs are rising, but they are not itemized either. In an October 2026 survey by the industry association Green Power Denmark, about three in four energy companies said their security spending had risen beyond normal price growth. The state budget for 2026 adds 500 million kroner a year “to strengthen societal security and preparedness broadly,” part of which goes to a new 24/7 situation center, according to a background note from the Ministry of Societal Security and Preparedness. That money is not specific to energy, or to this attack.

CostsSektorCERT report, page 4Green Power Denmark, October 22, 2026Ministry background note

What changed, and what is still not counted

The law did change. Act No. 258 of March 6, 2025, on strengthened preparedness in the energy sector, took effect on March 7, 2025, with an executive order that applies the EU’s NIS2 and CER directives to energy. Its chapter on the duty to notify allows the minister to set rules on reporting incidents. Requirements for multifactor authentication and passwords took effect in March 2025. Network segmentation, which would have made the May 2023 attacks much harder, must be in place by March 1, 2027 for companies covered by a transition rule, SektorCERT writes.

There is a gap at the bottom. Small companies, with fewer than 50 employees and turnover or a balance sheet of no more than 10 million euros, are covered only if they cross thresholds such as 25 megawatts of generation or a set volume of district heating sales, SektorCERT says. Below those lines, small plants fall outside the law. And this report found no public statistics on how many incidents energy companies have reported since the law took effect.

The threat assessments have moved in one direction. On June 30, 2026, the Danish Agency for Societal Security said that “the threat from destructive cyber attacks from Russia’s state hackers against Denmark has been sharpened” (SAMSIK, translated). In September 2026 it raised the threat level for destructive cyber attacks “from medium to high,” noting that pro-Russian hackers had manipulated water pressure at a small waterworks at the end of 2024 and that “450 households were without water for a period” (press release, translated).

In May 2023, Denmark was lucky, and its sector CERT said so plainly. The attackers knew where to aim, some firewalls stayed unpatched because the update had a price, and the people who stopped it were working past their hours. The episode was invisible to households by design. It has also stayed invisible on paper: no named victims, no published cost and no attribution, three and a half years on.

Law and threat levelAct No. 258 of March 6, 2025 (Retsinformation)SektorCERT, Poland report, October 2026SAMSIK, June 30, 2026Press release, September 2026 (Ritzau)

What is established, and what is not

Established

  • 22 companies operating parts of Danish energy infrastructure were compromised in May 2023 through Zyxel firewall flaws (SektorCERT).
  • Several companies went into island mode; one ran that way for six days. Customers did not lose power or heat.
  • Some members had opted out of updates because the supplier charged to install them.
  • SektorCERT says there is “no evidence to accuse Russia.” No government has attributed the attacks.

Not established

  • Who carried out either wave, and whether they were the same actor (SektorCERT leans toward two groups; Forescout says the waves were unrelated).
  • How the attackers knew which members were vulnerable.
  • Which companies were hit, and what recovery cost them.
  • Whether any police or intelligence investigation reached a conclusion.
  • How many incidents energy companies have reported under the 2025 law.

Sources

  1. May 11, 2023
    1. SektorCERT, The attack against Danish, critical infrastructure, November 2023
    2. SektorCERT, Danish edition
    3. DR, November 12, 2023
  2. Why the firewalls were open
    1. SektorCERT report, pages 9 and 10
    2. SektorCERT, Poland report, October 2026
    3. DR, November 14, 2023
  3. The second wave
    1. SektorCERT report, timeline, pages 12 to 26
  4. Island mode
    1. DR, November 12, 2023
    2. SektorCERT report, page 11
  5. Attribution
    1. SektorCERT report, pages 3, 8, 11, 16, 18
    2. TV 2, November 12, 2023
    3. DR, November 12, 2023
    4. Forescout, January 2024
    5. Security Affairs, December 20, 2025
    6. UK government, July 13, 2026
    7. SektorCERT, Poland report, October 2026
  6. Costs
    1. SektorCERT report, page 4
    2. Green Power Denmark, October 22, 2026
    3. Ministry background note
  7. Law and threat level
    1. Act No. 258 of March 6, 2025 (Retsinformation)
    2. SektorCERT, Poland report, October 2026
    3. SAMSIK, June 30, 2026
    4. Press release, September 2026 (Ritzau)
For journalists and researchers

Key facts, citable

  1. 22 companies that operate parts of the Danish energy infrastructure were compromised in a coordinated attack in May 2023. Source
  2. On May 11, 2023, 16 targets were attacked and 11 companies were compromised immediately. Source
  3. One member ran in island operation for six days after ordering a new firewall. Source
  4. SektorCERT: “There is therefore no evidence to accuse Russia of being involved in the attack.” Source
  5. Denmark raised its threat level for destructive cyber attacks from medium to high in September 2026. Source

Primary documents

Cite this

Researchez. “Twenty-Two Companies in Two Weeks: Denmark’s Largest Energy Hack, and What Its Investigators Would Not Say.” Researchez, November 20, 2026. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-denmark-energy-companies-may-2023.

Researchez. (2026, November 20). Twenty-Two Companies in Two Weeks: Denmark’s Largest Energy Hack, and What Its Investigators Would Not Say. Researchez. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-denmark-energy-companies-may-2023

https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-denmark-energy-companies-may-2023

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