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In Depth · Europe and United States · Fiscal impact

The Fiscal Ledger of Migration: Why Estimates Range from a Net Gain to €400 Billion

Published · 5 min read

Studies from Denmark, the Netherlands, the OECD, the UK and the US do not give one answer to whether migrants pay their way. They agree on something more useful: age, employment, wages, migration route and accounting choices matter more than a single national label.

In 60 seconds

Do immigrants cost the public purse or pay into it? The answer depends on who is counted and how. Denmark’s Finance Ministry found a net public cost of about 16 billion kroner in 2019, with Western immigrants contributing and non-Western groups costing more. A Dutch study put the net cost of 25 years of arrivals at €400 billion, a method the Dutch finance minister criticized. The OECD found the net effect in 25 countries was usually between −1% and +1% of GDP, mostly explained by age.

Summary

  • Denmark’s Finance Ministry estimated a net public cost of about 16 billion kroner in 2019 for immigrants and descendants combined. Western immigrants and descendants contributed about 11 billion; non-Western groups cost about 27 billion, including about 24 billion for MENAPT countries.
  • The Dutch study “Borderless Welfare State” estimated €400 billion in net costs for immigrants who arrived from 1995 to 2019. It found a positive contribution for labor migrants and large negative averages for family and asylum migration.
  • The Dutch finance minister said in 2021 that he could neither confirm nor deny the conclusions, criticizing the study’s method of allocating many indirect costs.
  • The OECD, comparing 25 countries from 2006 to 2018, found that immigrants’ total net fiscal contribution was usually between −1% and +1% of GDP. Differences in age structure explained 60% of cross-country differences in immigrants’ relative fiscal position.
  • The UK’s OBR found that a migrant earning the average wage on arrival at 25 becomes a net contributor in the second year. A low-wage migrant earning half the average becomes less beneficial than the average UK resident in their early 40s.

Denmark: an annual national snapshot

Denmark’s Finance Ministry publishes recurring estimates of immigrants’ and descendants’ net contribution to public finances. Its revised analysis for 2019, issued in September 2023 after correcting a country grouping error, said the correction did not change the results but adjusted some figures in tables.

For 2019, immigrants and descendants combined were associated with a net public expense of about 16 billion kroner. That total contained a net positive contribution of 11 billion kroner from Western immigrants and descendants and a negative net contribution of about 27 billion from non-Western immigrants and descendants. People from MENAPT countries (the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey) were associated with about 24 billion; other non-Western groups accounted for about 3 billion.

Those are annual budget estimates, not a judgment of any individual or a projection of a lifetime. The MENAPT category is a geographic country grouping used by the ministry. It does not record religion and should not be described as a Muslim category.

The Netherlands: the largest number and its critics

“Borderless Welfare State,” by Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer, uses a long-term accounting approach. Its English edition says that net costs for immigrants arriving between 1995 and 2019 total €400 billion. It also says the realized net cost in 2016 was €17 billion and that, under continued migration at the 2015–19 level, the annual burden would rise to about €50 billion in the long run.

The authors break the averages down by motive. Including the second generation and rounding to multiples of €25,000, they estimate a positive net contribution of €125,000 per labor migrant. They estimate net costs of €75,000 for study migration, €275,000 for family migration and €475,000 for asylum migration. Regional averages also vary within Western and non-Western categories.

Dutch Finance Minister Hoekstra responded in parliamentary answers received on September 14, 2021: “Ik kan deze conclusie niet bevestigen” (“I cannot confirm this conclusion”). He said the government keeps no ledger of costs and benefits for groups such as Dutch people, people with a migration background, people with disabilities or over-65s.

His criticism focused on method. The study, he wrote, counted direct contributions such as payroll tax, premiums and VAT while allocating many direct and indirect costs, including infrastructure, public administration, defence and culture. With that allocation, he said, most people with a migration background are net recipients, but so are about half of people without a migration background. He also argued it ignored the deliberate solidarity principle in the budget system.

The 2024 NIDI/Demos article by Justus van Kesteren and Daniël van Vuuren places the study inside a broader literature. It says research does not show social security to be a major driver of immigration. It also says net contributions depend on migration motive and country of origin, while immigration barely raises unemployment among local workers.

The OECD: a cross-country comparison

Ana Damas de Matos’s OECD chapter compares 22 European OECD countries, Australia, Canada and the United States from 2006 to 2018 using a common method. In every country studied, immigrants paid more in taxes and contributions than governments spent on their social protection, health and education.

When all public spending is included, the result is more mixed. The total net fiscal contribution of immigrants was positive in about a third of the countries. The chapter says it remained small throughout the period, between −1% and +1% of GDP for most countries.

Age is central. Differences in immigrants’ age distribution relative to native-born residents explain 60% of cross-country differences in their relative fiscal position. Employment also matters: closing employment gaps between prime-age foreign-born and native-born people of the same age and education could raise immigrants’ net fiscal contribution by over 0.5% of GDP in Belgium and Sweden.

The OECD review cites refugee research as well. It notes Joakim Ruist’s estimate of a refugee cost to Swedish public finances of 1% of GDP in 2007.

The UK and US: individuals over time

The OBR’s 2024 Fiscal Risks and Sustainability report illustrates the mechanics with representative people, not national groups. An illustrative migrant worker who arrives at 25 and earns the average UK wage becomes a net fiscal contributor by the second year. An average UK resident of the same age remains a net recipient until their 40s, because the resident has already used public education and health services in childhood.

Earnings change that path. A migrant earning 30% more than the UK average would remain a net benefit even if they lived to 100. A low-wage migrant arriving at 25 and earning half the UK average becomes less fiscally beneficial than the average UK resident in their early 40s. That does not mean the person is a net cost every year; it is a comparison of cumulative lifetime paths.

The US National Academies reached a similar distinction in 2016. First-generation immigrants were more costly to governments, mainly at state and local levels, largely because of the cost of educating children. As adults, the second generation was among the strongest economic and fiscal contributors. Over the long term, the report found generally positive federal effects and negative state and local effects, subject to important assumptions.

How to report the ledger

The estimates are not interchangeable. Denmark’s figure is an annual public-finance estimate. The Dutch number is a cumulative estimate for arrival cohorts and their children under its own cost-allocation choices. The OECD figure is a share of GDP, while the OBR illustrations compare lifetime paths.

Every article on migration costs should state the method, year, population and accounting boundaries. It should report opposing findings where they exist, distinguish migration route from origin and avoid applying an average to an individual. A responsible ledger can document costs and contributions. It should not use public-finance averages to define the worth of a group of people.

Sources

  1. Danish Ministry of Finance, “Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019,” revised September 2023
  2. Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer, “Borderless Welfare State,” English edition, 2023
  3. Dutch Minister of Finance, parliamentary answer 4036, received September 14, 2021
  4. Justus van Kesteren and Daniël van Vuuren, “Tussen feit en fictie: de invloed van migratie op sociale zekerheid,” NIDI/Demos, August 30, 2024
  5. Ana Damas de Matos, “The fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries since the mid-2000s,” OECD International Migration Outlook 2021
  6. Office for Budget Responsibility, “Fiscal risks and sustainability,” September 2024
  7. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, “New Report Assesses the Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” September 21, 2016

Further reading

Topics: migration, fiscal impact, methodology.

For journalists and researchers

Primary documents

Cite this

Researchez. “The Fiscal Ledger of Migration: Why Estimates Range from a Net Gain to €400 Billion.” Researchez, November 18, 2026. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-fiscal-ledger-migration-estimates-range-net.

Researchez. (2026, November 18). The Fiscal Ledger of Migration: Why Estimates Range from a Net Gain to €400 Billion. Researchez. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-fiscal-ledger-migration-estimates-range-net

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