Editorial illustration: an independence rally in Glasgow’s George Square.
Editorial illustration: an independence rally in Glasgow’s George Square.
Investigations · November 2026

When Propaganda Goes Offline

By Researchez Investigations · Published · Updated : key points, timeline, cost box and a summary of what is established added · 4 min read

Ukraine says its strikes on Russian data centers disrupted Moscow’s online propaganda. The evidence is mixed. Earlier cases in Russia and Iran show how to tell when a campaign has really been interrupted.

In 60 seconds

In October 2026, a Ukrainian strike knocked a Russian data center offline. Ukraine said accounts spreading Russian propaganda went quiet. Posts from the accounts Ukraine flagged did fall sharply that day, but two days later there were more than before. Nobody has shown that those accounts relied on that data center. No public figure exists for what these campaigns cost, or what it costs to fight them.

Key points

  • On October 8, 2026, a Ukrainian drone strike shut down a Yandex data center in Sasovo, Russia. Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation counted an 84 percent fall that day in posts on Ukrainian topics by accounts it considered suspicious. Two days later the count was higher than before.
  • Graphika found the busiest posters in communities where political accounts had supposedly vanished were still there. No public record shows which accounts, if any, relied on Yandex. Claim only
  • Earlier outages show the test: in 2018 U.S. officials said Cyber Command cut off the Internet Research Agency on election day; in 2024 links from the Russian Doppelgänger network broke when the redirect service was cut off.
  • When Iran restricted internet access in June 2025 and January 2026, accounts in a network Cyabra judged fake and attributed to the Iranian state, posing as Scottish independence supporters, fell silent. Vendor assessment

On October 8, 2026, a Ukrainian drone strike shut down a Yandex data center in Sasovo, Russia. Two more of the company’s sites were hit within three days. On October 12, Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Warsaw Security Forum it was suddenly “a little easier to breathe” on social media. He thought some of the accounts spreading hate had gone down with the servers.

A graph making the rounds seemed to back him up. Cloudflare had measured a 99 percent fall in traffic from Yandex’s search network. Most of that traffic came from programs fetching pages for a search engine. When researchers at Graphika looked directly at the pro-Trump and German far-right communities where political accounts had supposedly vanished, their busiest posters were still there.

Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation counted the posts themselves. Posts on Ukrainian topics by Facebook and Telegram accounts they considered suspicious fell 84 percent the day the first data center shut down. Two days later the count was higher than before the strike. The dip was real. Which of those accounts, if any, relied on Yandex? On that point the public record runs out.

Daily posts from accounts flagged by Ukrainian investigators, October 2026
  1. 4,032Oct 7
  2. 660Oct 8
  3. 2,231Oct 9
  4. 4,585Oct 10
  5. 4,711Oct 11
  6. 2,704Oct 12

Oct 8: first Yandex data center offline

Original chart from data published by Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation. The sample covered 5,201 accounts and 26 topics.

The Yandex strikesWarsaw addressYandexCloudflare on YandexGraphikaUkraine’s post counts

Where have we seen this before?

In the 2018 U.S. midterms, the complaints came from inside a Russian troll farm. Staff at the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg, who had posed as Americans online, told their IT administrators their connection was down. U.S. officials told The Washington Post that Cyber Command had cut the agency off on election day and kept it offline during the vote count. Donald Trump later confirmed he had authorized the operation.

Officials credited the outage with preventing an effort to cast doubt on the results. No public tally shows how many posts it prevented. Bret Schafer, who monitored a wider set of propaganda accounts, told ABC News he saw no dramatic drop that day.

Six years later, it was readers who could see what had broken. A Russian network called Doppelgänger sent people to imitations of newspapers such as Der Spiegel. U.S. authorities seized 32 web addresses, and replacements appeared. Then journalists at CORRECTIV and researchers at Qurium traced the service that sent readers to the fake articles. Its operator lived in southern Ukraine. When CORRECTIV contacted him, he blocked the Russian customer. The accounts kept posting, but most of their old links on X led to error pages. The operators found another provider.

Sixteen days without Lucy

An outage can also give away who is behind an account. On June 11, 2025, an X user called Lucy asked whether Scotland should be independent. The next day Fiona shared the question with a one-word answer. “Yes.” In May their roles had been reversed. Fiona had asked why Westminster wanted Scotland to stay. Lucy had replied that Scots needed control of their own resources.

Lucy, Fiona, Jake and Kelly regularly shared one another’s posts. Cyabra, a firm that investigates online manipulation, identified all four among 1,332 profiles it judged fake in a sample of 5,083 discussing Scottish independence. On June 13, the day Israel struck Iran, many of the accounts fell silent.

The war offered a straightforward explanation. Tehran restricted internet access, citing the risk of cyberattacks. Cloudflare measured a brief shutdown on June 13 and a longer one from June 18 to 25. Anyone running a Scottish account from Iran could have lost access because of that decision. The figures can’t tell us why Lucy stayed away for sixteen days. Her posts tell us what she did next.

CyabraSEC filingBoard of directorsNATO center’s study

The 2018 electionThe Washington PostTrump’s confirmationOfficials’ assessmentABC News

DoppelgängerU.S. Justice DepartmentCORRECTIVQurium

Accounts and shutdownsCyabra, pp. 2, 7, 10–12Iran’s June shutdowns

When Lucy came back

Only a minority of the accounts resumed posting, according to Cyabra. They returned on different days. On June 26, Alisa Stewart, supposedly an environmental science student in Glasgow, claimed Iran had made Israel and the United States beg for a ceasefire. She asked whether Scots could show the same resolve and break with the monarchy. The post carried the hashtag #ScottishIndependence.

Lucy reappeared on June 29 with a photograph of a damaged building. “Israel’s great failure,” read the caption. She still posted about independence. Anyone who had followed Lucy for Scottish politics could now hear Iran’s case for victory from a familiar voice.

Editorial illustration: Milad Tower and the Tehran skyline at dusk.
Editorial illustration: Milad Tower and the Tehran skyline at dusk.

By November, Alisa was back to complaining about Labour’s promises on fuel bills, The Times reported. BBC Verify found that her profile still said Glasgow. X listed the Netherlands, warned that a VPN might be masking the location, and displayed a separate entry for how the account had connected. It read “Iran Android App.” Cyabra attributed the network to the Iranian state. The people writing the posts remain unidentified.

Then came a second test. On January 8, 2026, Jake announced that the United Kingdom had “ceased to exist in the hearts of Scots.” That evening, amid protests, Tehran shut down the internet again. Cloudflare saw traffic fall almost to zero. The UK Defence Journal checked Jake’s feed. Once again, he had stopped posting.

Governments plan for how to stop a ballistic missile from reaching its target. Perhaps they should give the same attention to stopping a wartime propaganda campaign from reaching its audience. Even a temporary interruption can matter. For a while, anyone who clicked one of Doppelgänger’s broken links never saw the lie. The question is harder in Kyiv’s case. Civilian data centers have legal protection. Ukraine has shown that a building went offline and that a group of suspicious accounts briefly posted less. What it has yet to show is that one depended on the other.

The published postsCyabra, pp. 2, 7, 10–12The TimesBBC VerifyHouse of Commons

January 2026Jake’s January postsThe Times on the January pauseIran’s January shutdown

Civilian infrastructure in warICRC

What is established, and what is not

Established

  • A Yandex data center in Sasovo went offline on October 8, 2026, and posts by the accounts Ukraine flagged fell sharply that day, then recovered within two days.
  • U.S. authorities seized 32 Doppelgänger web addresses. Government-attributed
  • Accounts in the network Cyabra identified stopped posting during Iran’s internet shutdowns in June 2025 and January 2026.

Not established

  • That the flagged accounts depended on Yandex. Ukraine has not shown it. Claim only
  • How many posts the 2018 outage prevented. No public tally exists.
  • Who writes the Scottish accounts. Cyabra attributes the network to the Iranian state; the people behind the posts remain unidentified. Vendor assessment

Sources

  1. The Yandex strikes
    1. Warsaw address
    2. Yandex
    3. Cloudflare on Yandex
    4. Graphika
    5. Ukraine’s post counts
  2. Cyabra
    1. SEC filing
    2. Board of directors
    3. NATO center’s study
  3. The 2018 election
    1. The Washington Post
    2. Trump’s confirmation
    3. Officials’ assessment
    4. ABC News
  4. Doppelgänger
    1. U.S. Justice Department
    2. CORRECTIV
    3. Qurium
  5. Accounts and shutdowns
    1. Cyabra, pp. 2, 7, 10–12
    2. Iran’s June shutdowns
  6. The published posts
    1. Cyabra, pp. 2, 7, 10–12
    2. The Times
    3. BBC Verify
    4. House of Commons
  7. January 2026
    1. Jake’s January posts
    2. The Times on the January pause
    3. Iran’s January shutdown
  8. Civilian infrastructure in war
    1. ICRC
For journalists and researchers

Key facts, citable

  1. Cloudflare measured a 99 percent fall in traffic from Yandex’s search network; most of that traffic came from programs fetching pages for a search engine. Source
  2. Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation counted an 84 percent fall in posts by accounts it considered suspicious on October 8, 2026; two days later the count was higher than before. Source
  3. Graphika found the busiest posters in the communities said to have gone quiet were still active. Source
  4. U.S. authorities seized 32 web addresses used by the Doppelgänger network. Source
  5. Cyabra judged 1,332 of 5,083 profiles discussing Scottish independence to be fake and attributed the network to the Iranian state (vendor assessment). Source
  6. Cloudflare measured an internet shutdown in Iran on June 13, 2025 and a longer one from June 18 to 25. Source

Primary documents

Cite this

Researchez Investigations. “When Propaganda Goes Offline.” Researchez, November 2026. Updated November 20, 2026. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-propaganda-offline.

Researchez Investigations. (2026, November 18). When Propaganda Goes Offline. Researchez. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-propaganda-offline

https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-propaganda-offline

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