
When Propaganda Goes Offline
The situation
In October 2026, a Ukrainian strike knocked a Russian data center offline. Ukraine said accounts spreading Russian propaganda went quiet. Posts from the accounts Ukraine flagged did fall sharply that day, but two days later there were more than before. Nobody has shown that those accounts relied on that data center. No public figure exists for what these campaigns cost, or what it costs to fight them.
Attribution status
Claim only Ukraine says its strikes on Russian data centers silenced propaganda accounts. Its own counts show a one-day fall in posts by flagged accounts and a recovery within two days. No public evidence shows those accounts depended on the data center. Separately, Cyabra (a vendor) attributes a fake-account network to the Iranian state.
Documented public cost
- No public figure exists for the cost of these campaigns, of the outages, or of countering them.
What remains open
- Whether the flagged accounts depended on Yandex.
- How many posts the 2018 outage prevented.
- Who writes the Scottish accounts.
Primary sources
- Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, post counts (Ukrainian): https://cpd.gov.ua/reports/analitychnyj-zvit-koly-boty-zamovkayut-na-shho-vplynuly-udary-po-data-czentrah-yandeksu/
- U.S. Justice Department, Doppelgänger seizure: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-covert-russian-government-sponsored-foreign-malign-influence
- Cyabra report (vendor), July 2025: https://lp.cyabra.com/hubfs/Reports%20Fiels/IRANIAN_BOT_NETWORK_EXPOSED_July_2025.pdf
- Cloudflare, Iran’s January 2026 shutdown: https://blog.cloudflare.com/iran-protests-internet-shutdown
- ICRC on protections for civilian ICT infrastructure in armed conflict: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2026/04/23/upholding-ihl-protections-against-the-risks-of-ict-activities-in-armed-conflict/