
Not a Cyberattack: How Spain Ruled Out Sabotage in the Great Blackout, and the Bill It Never Counted
When the Iberian Peninsula lost power on April 28, 2025, many suspected an attack. A government committee, a court and Europe’s grid operators found none. They found a grid that could not control its own voltage. What the day cost, and what the fix is costing, Spain has never officially counted.
In 60 seconds
On April 28, 2025, all of Spain and mainland Portugal lost electricity at once. Many people suspected hackers. Spain’s government, a court and Europe’s grid operators all looked into it and found no sign of a cyberattack; the grid failed because it could not keep voltage under control. But nobody has published an official figure for what the blackout cost, or for how many deaths it may have caused. Since then, running the grid more safely has added hundreds of millions of euros to electricity bills.
Key points
- Spain and mainland Portugal lost power at 12:33:30 on April 28, 2025. Power returned to 99.95% of Spanish demand by 7 a.m. the next day.
- A government committee, a National Court judge and Europe’s grid operators found no cyberattack. The committee’s finding is limited to the entities analysed, a seven-day window and the data it received. Officially ruled out
- The committee traced the collapse to insufficient voltage control and disconnections, some “apparently improper.”
- No official cost has been published. Estimates range from under 400 million to more than 1.6 billion euros, and the reinforced grid operation that followed had cost consumers 666 million euros by March 2026, according to Red Eléctrica.
At 12:33:30 on April 28, 2025, the voltage on the Iberian Peninsula fell to zero (committee report, page 3). Spain and mainland Portugal went dark at once. Trains stopped between stations, traffic lights failed and phone networks faded. By 10 p.m. power had returned to nearly half of Spanish demand; by 7 a.m. the next day, to 99.95% (Ministry for the Ecological Transition).
In the first hours, the question everyone asked was whether someone had done it. The European Council president, António Costa, said that “at this point, there are no indications of any cyberattack” (RTÉ). Portugal’s prime minister, Luís Montenegro, said there was “no indication” of one, but that no scenario was “out of the question” (Anadolu). The next day, a judge at Spain’s National Court opened an investigation, noting that while the cause was unknown, “cyberterrorism is among the possible ones” (LegalToday, translated). The grid operator, Red Eléctrica, was quicker to dismiss the idea. On the same day, its head of system operation said that on a “preliminary” basis “we can rule out a cybersecurity incident,” and that “there has been no intrusion of any kind into the control systems” (Newtral, translated).
Fourteen months of inquiries later, that possibility has been officially ruled out, by a government committee, by a court, and implicitly by Europe’s grid operators, who traced the collapse to failures of voltage control. This investigation looks at how that conclusion was reached, what its limits are, and what the day without power cost. No Spanish authority has published that last figure.
April 28, 2025Committee for the analysis of the crisis, non-confidential report, June 2025Ministry for the Ecological Transition, June 17, 2025RTÉ, April 28, 2025Anadolu, April 28, 2025LegalToday, April 29, 2025Newtral, April 29, 2025
How the cyber theory was tested
Spain’s government set up a committee with two working groups, one on the electricity system and one on cybersecurity. The cybersecurity group, led by the national CERTs, gathered about 133 gigabytes of information, analysed more than 1,000 public IP addresses and deployed more than 75 people in six teams, who put in more than 1,200 hours of work (report, pages 12, 14-15 and 165). The ministry called it “the largest cybersecurity investigation in Spain’s history,” and said the committee’s two working groups together analysed more than 300 gigabytes of information (ministry, translated).
It also watched the places where attackers usually boast. Monitoring was stepped up on forums “frequently used by certain actors to claim cyberattacks, sell extracted data, extortion, etc., without any relevant action being identified” (report, page 15, translated). Nobody claimed the blackout.
The conclusion, on page 129, is precise. “Taking into account the scope and remit of this analysis, as well as the limitations set out in this document, it can be determined that no indications or evidence have been found that point to a cyberattack or cyber incident, in the entities analysed, that could have caused the energy crisis of April 28, 2025” (report, translated). Presenting the report on June 17, 2025, the vice-president for the ecological transition, Sara Aagesen, said “there is no evidence of cyber-incident or cyber-attack as the cause” (La Moncloa).
The cyber inquiryCommittee report, pages 14-15, 126-129, 164-165Ministry for the Ecological TransitionLa Moncloa, press conference, June 17, 2025
What “ruled out” covers, and what it does not
The qualifiers in that sentence are deliberate. The analysis covered a window of at most “seven days prior” to 12:33 on April 28 (report, page 126, translated). It covered the entities examined, not every generator on the grid. And the same page that rules out an attack lists weaknesses the analysts found: “In some cases there is no system for centralizing activity logs,” and some infrastructures “do not have their IT and OT infrastructures and networks sufficiently segregated” (report, page 129, translated).
The report is candid about its other gaps. Some measurements did not have the correct calibration, an issue the committee says was corrected. Some data could not be provided, mainly because participants lacked the necessary equipment; supplying information was voluntary; and there was “information that for various reasons has not been received” by the time the report was finished (report, page 12, translated). An absence of evidence was found partly where evidence is not kept.
The court reached the same answer by a different route. On January 12, 2026, Judge José Luis Calama provisionally closed the National Court’s investigation because there was not “a minimum indication” of terrorist sabotage. He relied on a report from the national cryptologic centre, which analysed a 70-gigabyte file from the system that centralizes security events in the grid’s operational technology; on the joint cyberspace command, which visited five generation control centres; eight reports from the national cybersecurity institute INCIBE finding “no detection of any type of potentially harmful action of a cyber nature,” and police analysis of 8,028 recordings and 1,296 emails supplied by the grid operator (General Council of the Judiciary, translated). He described the case as “a conflict of an eminently administrative and/or civil nature.” The closure is provisional, not final, and INCIBE’s reports have not been published.
Europe’s grid operators did not rule out an attack so much as never consider one. The final report of the ENTSO-E expert panel, published in March 2026 and 472 pages long, attributes the blackout to “a combination of many interacting factors,” including oscillations and gaps in voltage and reactive power control (ENTSO-E). A text search of that report and of its October 2025 factual report finds no mention of cyberattacks at all. The panel did record its own difficulty: “collecting complete and high-quality data proved very challenging for this investigation” (ENTSO-E). Part of its picture of small rooftop solar systems disconnecting rested on data from just two inverter manufacturers.
Limits and the courtCommittee report, pages 12, 126, 129General Council of the Judiciary, January 12, 2026ENTSO-E, Iberian blackout reports
What did happen
The committee’s answer was that the blackout “had a multifactorial origin” (report, page 130, translated). The system “showed an insufficiency of dynamic voltage control capacity” (report, page 131, translated). The number of synchronous plants connected that day was the lowest since the start of the year, and some plants that were paid to regulate voltage did not respond adequately (ministry).
After oscillations that morning, the operator scheduled an additional plant to control voltage, but it needed an hour and a half to start and did not connect before the system collapsed (report, page 131). Generating plants then disconnected, “in some cases in an apparently improper way” (ministry, translated), each disconnection pushing voltage higher in a “chain reaction” that could not be contained. The ministry was clear that the shortage was not of capacity: there was “a more than sufficient generation fleet” in the country (ministry, translated). Aagesen argued that the “point of no return” could have been avoided if “early action” had been taken to control the voltage (La Moncloa).
ENTSO-E reached a compatible conclusion and added detail. The blackout “originated in Spain, not in Portugal” (page 17), and many renewable plants “maintained a fixed power factor,” so they did not help hold voltage steady (page 13). It called April 28 “a first of its kind event.” Restoration, it found, took 16 hours in Spain and 12 in Portugal (ENTSO-E). Portugal’s regulator later concluded that its own grid operator, REN, had operated the network “correctly and diligently” during restoration (ERSE, translated).
Before the reports came out, false explanations filled the gap. A widely shared claim that Portugal’s grid operator, REN, had blamed “a rare atmospheric phenomenon” was false; REN denied issuing such a statement (Observador).
The causeCommittee report, pages 130-133Ministry for the Ecological TransitionENTSO-E final report, March 2026Observador fact-check
What a day without power cost
No Spanish authority has published a final cost of the blackout, for households, businesses or the state. The figures that exist are estimates, and they are listed here by source.
Spain’s economy minister, Carlos Cuerpo, gave a preliminary maximum of 800 million euros two days after the blackout. Card payment data from the processor Redsys showed activity down about 55% on the day compared with a reference Monday, about 400 million euros (Europa Press via Bolsamania, translated).
The employers’ federation CEOE put the impact at 0.1% of 2025 GDP, “more than 1.6 billion euros” (FashionUnited, translated). CaixaBank Research, a private bank’s research unit, found household card spending fell 34% that day, but more than half was recovered in the next two days, leaving a net drop of 15% in expected spending for that Monday, and a net effect on second-quarter GDP of “less than 400 million euros” (CaixaBank Research, translated).
In Portugal, the central bank reported a 15% drop in economic activity on April 28 (DN/Lusa). A survey of 1,710 companies by the industrial association AIP estimated losses above 2 billion euros (Observador). That is an industry estimate, not an official figure.
Lives. Spain has not published an official count of deaths linked to the blackout, and the committee’s report does not contain one. Researchers at the state epidemiology centre, using the national mortality monitoring system, found 147 excess deaths over three days (95% confidence interval: −35 to 330), a 4.2% increase that was not statistically significant overall, and a significant 7.9% increase among people aged 65 to 84. They noted that the system “cannot attribute such excesses to specific causes” (Eurosurveillance).
Insurance and compensation. Spain’s public insurer of last resort, the Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros, which covered losses from the 2024 Valencia floods, does not apply here, because it would only be activated if the blackout had a natural cause such as an atmospheric event (Ara, translated). In Portugal, the energy regulator ERSE classified the blackout as an “exceptional event” of external origin, which means customers have no right to individual compensation under service quality rules (ERSE).
CostsEuropa Press via Bolsamania, April 30, 2025FashionUnited (CEOE), April 30, 2025CaixaBank ResearchDN/Lusa (Banco de Portugal), May 8, 2025Observador (AIP), May 27, 2025Eurosurveillance, 2025AraERSE, May 2026
The bill that keeps arriving
The most durable cost came after the lights were back. From April 30, 2025, Spain’s grid operator, Red Eléctrica, has run the system in “reinforced operation,” keeping more conventional plants connected to control voltage. Red Eléctrica puts the extra cost up to March 2026 at 666 million euros, a cost that “has fallen on the consumer,” Infobae reported; a consultancy, Selecta, calculated that the regulated electricity price rose 13.2% on average as a direct result (Infobae, translated).
The government’s emergency decree to strengthen the system, Royal Decree-law 7/2025, was rejected by Congress on July 22, 2025 (Official State Gazette).
In April 2026 the competition and markets regulator, CNMC, opened sanction proceedings against companies after finding “indications of infringements of sector regulations over prolonged periods,” while stressing that these “do not, by themselves, imply attributing the origin or cause of the blackout” to the companies concerned (CNMC, translated). Portugal’s government said the ENTSO-E report “confirms that the Portuguese authorities are not responsible” (Portuguese government, translated).
AfterwardsInfobae, April 27, 2026Official State Gazette, July 24, 2025CNMC, April 17, 2026Portuguese government, March 20, 2026
Why this case matters
Not every failure of critical infrastructure is an attack, and saying so plainly is part of honest reporting on hybrid threats. Spain did the work: a large technical inquiry, a court investigation, and a European expert review, all of which pointed to the grid’s own weaknesses rather than an adversary. Its committee also wrote down, on the same page, the limits of what it could see.
What Spain has not done is count the cost. There is no official figure for the losses of April 28, no official count of the deaths it may have caused, and no public total for the higher bills that followed. The cyberattack was ruled out. The bill was never ruled in.
What is established, and what is not
Established
- The Iberian system collapsed at 12:33:30 on April 28, 2025, after a chain reaction of overvoltage disconnections.
- The government committee found no indications of a cyberattack in the entities analysed. Officially ruled out
- The National Court provisionally closed its investigation, finding no indication of terrorist sabotage.
- No official cost or death toll has been published.
Not established
- Which companies’ plants disconnected improperly; the report anonymizes them, and CNMC proceedings are pending.
- What the information that was never received would have shown.
- The official cost of the blackout and of the reinforced operation that followed.
- Whether any deaths can be attributed to the blackout.
- The content of INCIBE’s eight reports, which have not been published.
Sources
- April 28, 2025
- The cyber inquiry
- Limits and the court
- The cause
- Costs
- Afterwards
For journalists and researchers
Key facts, citable
- The committee report: “no indications or evidence have been found that point to a cyberattack or cyber incident, in the entities analysed.” Source
- The Iberian system reached zero voltage at 12:33:30 on April 28, 2025. Source
- The National Court provisionally closed its investigation on January 12, 2026, finding no “minimum indication” of terrorist sabotage. Source
- Researchers estimated 147 excess deaths over three days (95% CI −35 to 330); the monitoring system cannot attribute them to specific causes. Source
- Red Eléctrica puts the extra cost of reinforced operation up to March 2026 at 666 million euros. Source
Primary documents
- Committee for the analysis of the crisis, non-confidential report
- La Moncloa, press conference, June 17, 2025
- ENTSO-E, Iberian blackout reports
- General Council of the Judiciary, closure of the investigation
- CNMC, sanction proceedings, April 2026
- ERSE, exceptional event classification
Cite this
Researchez. “Not a Cyberattack: How Spain Ruled Out Sabotage in the Great Blackout, and the Bill It Never Counted.” Researchez, November 20, 2026. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-spain-blackout-cyberattack-ruled-out.
Researchez. (2026, November 20). Not a Cyberattack: How Spain Ruled Out Sabotage in the Great Blackout, and the Bill It Never Counted. Researchez. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-spain-blackout-cyberattack-ruled-out
https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-spain-blackout-cyberattack-ruled-out
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