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Investigations · United States

Five Years Inside: Who Pays to Find China’s Hackers in America’s Water and Power Networks

By Researchez Investigations · Published · 9 min read

U.S. agencies say Chinese state hackers have sat in critical infrastructure networks for at least five years, ready to disrupt them in a crisis. They have named no victims and shown no damage. One small utility rebuilt its network. Nobody has published what the cleanup costs, or who is paying.

In 60 seconds

U.S. agencies say Chinese government hackers have been hiding inside American water, power and communications networks for years, getting ready to cause disruption if there is ever a war. They have not shown any damage yet, and they have not said which companies were hit or how many. One small Massachusetts utility told its story: it had to rebuild its whole network. Nobody has said what that cost, or what it costs to clear the hackers out anywhere else. China says the whole thing was invented to get more money from Congress.

Key points

  • U.S. and allied agencies say Chinese state-sponsored actors known as Volt Typhoon have sat inside some U.S. critical infrastructure networks “for at least five years,” preparing for disruption in a crisis. Government-attributed
  • The government has named no victims, given no count and documented no actual disruption. The only utility to describe its case publicly is Littleton, Massachusetts, which rebuilt its network.
  • No dollar figure for finding and removing the intruders has been published anywhere. Federal help reached Littleton “at no cost,” but the utility’s own rebuild cost is unknown.
  • Grant programs that help small utilities have lapsed or are expiring, and the federal incident-reporting rule is still not in force.

On a Friday just before Thanksgiving 2023, the FBI called the Littleton Electric Light and Water Departments, a small public utility in Massachusetts, to say its network had been compromised. Accounts differ on who took the call: the general manager, Nick Lawler, told The Register it was him; The Record, citing the security firm Dragos, says it was the assistant general manager. Either way, federal officials came to the office. They told Lawler the government was there to help “at no cost to the public utility,” The Register reported, and then wished him a happy Thanksgiving.

The intruders were the group the U.S. government calls Volt Typhoon, and they had been in the utility’s systems since February 2023 (The Record). They got in through a FortiGate firewall that the manufacturer had patched in December 2022 but that the utility’s managed service provider still had not updated, Lawler said. Littleton only had sensors that could see the intrusion because Dragos had installed them in August 2023 under a government-funded program of the American Public Power Association. The federal agencies put in sensors of their own and asked the utility to leave the hole open for a while so they could watch. A week before Christmas, the intruders were out. The utility “completely rebuilt its networks,” The Register reported.

No one has published what that rebuild cost. Littleton is the only Volt Typhoon victim this investigation found that has described its case in public. The U.S. government says there are many more, in water, power, communications and transport networks, and that some intruders have been inside for at least five years. Who pays to find and remove them is mostly unanswered. This investigation found no published dollar figure for it anywhere: not in the government’s advisories, not in testimony to Congress, and not in any utility filing.

Littleton, MassachusettsThe Register, March 12, 2025The Record, March 12, 2025Dragos case study, March 2025

What the government says

The core claim is in a joint advisory published on February 7, 2024 by CISA, the National Security Agency and the FBI, with the Energy Department, the EPA, the Transportation Security Administration and agencies from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand (AA24-038A). It says Chinese state-sponsored actors “are seeking to pre-position themselves on IT networks for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.” The U.S. agencies “assess with high confidence” that Volt Typhoon is positioning itself to move from office networks to the operational systems that run physical equipment, and say they have seen indications of footholds in some victims’ networks “for at least five years.” The targets named are communications, energy, transportation and water systems “in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam.”

The advisory describes one confirmed water-sector case in some detail. Over a nine-month period, the intruders moved from a VPN connection to a file server, a domain controller, an Oracle management server and a VMware server, and “potentially had access to a range of critical PuTTY profiles, including those for water treatment plants, water wells, an electrical substation, OT systems, and network security devices.” In another case, they “moved laterally to a control system and were positioned to move to a second control system.” Some victims, it says, “are smaller organizations with limited cybersecurity capabilities that provide critical services to larger organizations or key geographic locations.”

The assessment hardened over time. In May 2023, Microsoft, which named the group, said it assessed “with moderate confidence” that the campaign was developing capabilities that “could disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the United States and Asia region during future crises” (Microsoft). By January 2024 the officials were blunter. The CISA director at the time, Jen Easterly, told a House committee the aim was “to prevent the United States from projecting power into Asia or to cause societal chaos inside the United States,” and that CISA was “assisting several critical infrastructure entities across multiple sectors that already have been compromised” (testimony).

The same day, the Justice Department said a court-authorized operation in December 2023 had removed Volt Typhoon’s malware from “hundreds of U.S.-based small office/home office (SOHO) routers,” most of them Cisco and NetGear devices that had reached “end of life” and no longer received security updates. “China’s hackers are targeting American civilian critical infrastructure, pre-positioning to cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities in the event of conflict,” the FBI director, Christopher Wray, said in the announcement. The fix was temporary: “A router’s owner can reverse these mitigation steps by restarting the router” (Justice Department; full text via GlobalSecurity).

The U.S. caseCISA and partners, advisory AA24-038AAA24-038A, PDFMicrosoft, May 24, 2023Easterly testimony, January 31, 2024Justice Department, January 31, 2024Same release, full text (GlobalSecurity)

A capability, not a damage report

For all its detail, the advisory does not document a single disruption. It describes access, positioning and potential. The intruders, it says, “exhibit minimal activity within the compromised environment,” which suggests “their objective is to maintain persistence rather than immediate exploitation.” It names no victims and gives no count. When pressed on how many there were, U.S. officials said any number “is likely an underestimate” (The Record).

The only figure in the public record comes secondhand. Lawler told The Register that the FBI agent who called him said Littleton was “one of 200 utilities on a list of organizations that had been breached.” No agency has confirmed that number. In October 2026, Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs said Volt Typhoon had quietly built a new relay network, which it called Silent Train, for a three-year campaign. Nextgov quoted a former U.S. official, speaking anonymously, as saying that “multiple utility providers have also been dealing with Volt Typhoon-related issues” over a similar period.

That is the limit of what can be proved. Volt Typhoon is, on the public evidence, a story about what an adversary could do, and about a cleanup whose size nobody will state. It is not a story about lights going out.

What is and is not documentedAA24-038A, PDFThe Record, March 12, 2025The Register, March 12, 2025Nextgov, October 28, 2026

Beijing’s answer is about money too

China denies all of it, and its denial is, unusually, an argument about budgets. On April 15, 2024, the foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian cited a Chinese report saying that Volt Typhoon “is actually a ransomware cybercriminal group who calls itself the ‘Dark Power’ and is not sponsored by any state or region.” He went on: “There are signs that in order to receive more congressional budgets and government contracts, the US intelligence community and cybersecurity companies have been secretly collaborating to piece together false evidence” (Chinese embassy transcript).

A second report by China’s National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center, in July 2024, said U.S. agencies “orchestrated and hyped up the ‘Volt Typhoon’ cyberthreat narrative to secure additional funding from the US Congress” (China Daily). A Western researcher dismissed it. “This is likely an effort from the Chinese government to manipulate public perceptions of China threats,” Trellix’s head of threat intelligence told The Record. In October 2024, the ministry added that Guam, “which the US claimed to be the victim,” is “actually the headquarter of a large number of cyberattacks against China” (foreign ministry).

Neither side has published the budget figures the argument turns on. Washington has not said what the hunt has cost, and Beijing has not shown which appropriations it believes were inflated.

China’s responseForeign ministry press conference, April 15, 2024 (embassy transcript)China Daily, July 9, 2024The Record, July 10, 2024Foreign ministry, October 15, 2024

Who pays

Littleton’s case shows the pattern. The monitoring that caught the intruders came through the American Public Power Association, which runs programs funded by the Energy Department. Through its cybersecurity programs to date, APPA “has awarded over $14 million to 32 utilities, funding 78 cybersecurity projects,” according to a Dragos case study, a vendor’s marketing document. The Energy Department’s cybersecurity office signed a $6 million cooperative agreement with the association. Which grant paid for Littleton’s sensors has not been published. The federal response was free to the utility; its own rebuild was not, and its cost is unknown.

For larger electric utilities, the bill has a route to customers. In 2023 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission said it may be appropriate to let a utility “defer recovery of certain cybersecurity costs … and treat them as regulatory assets, while also allowing such regulatory assets to be included in transmission rate base” (Order No. 893). In plain terms, approved security spending can be recovered through transmission rates. This investigation found no filing that names Volt Typhoon.

Water has no such route. According to the Congressional Research Service, 80.6% of community water systems are “small,” serving 3,300 people or fewer. A Safe Drinking Water Act program to give water systems resilience grants was authorized, but “Congress did not provide appropriations for this program.” The advisory itself asks water utilities to contact the EPA “to voluntarily provide situational awareness.”

The federal programs that do exist are general, temporary or shrinking. CISA’s Cybersecurity Response and Recovery Fund received $20 million a year from fiscal 2022 to 2026 (CRS); no use of it for Volt Typhoon has been published. Easterly cited a shared-services pilot for “target rich, resource poor” organizations such as water utilities (testimony), with no dollar figure attached. The $1 billion State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program lapsed on September 30, 2026, “the program’s third funding lapse since September 2025” (FDD). At a House hearing in December 2025, a cooperative utility chief urged Congress to reauthorize the $250 million Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity Program, “which runs through fiscal year 2026” (Utility Dive).

CISA itself is smaller. Its fiscal 2026 appropriation of $2.6 billion is “about $300 million less than its current annual budget,” Federal News Network reported, though it includes $20 million “to undo many of the administration’s irresponsible cuts to critical positions” (Senate Appropriations summary). In April 2026, a witness from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told a House subcommittee that the president’s fiscal 2027 proposal “calls for an additional $707 million reduction in funding for CISA’s work,” and cited a vacancy rate of 40 percent in key mission areas, “according to CISA’s own assessment” (testimony).

Costs and fundingDragos case study (vendor document)American Public Power AssociationFERC Order No. 893, Federal Register, May 3, 2023Congressional Research Service, R48556Congressional Research Service, R48874FDD, October 5, 2026Utility Dive, December 3, 2025Federal News Network, January 20, 2026Senate Appropriations, FY2026 summaryMontgomery testimony, April 29, 2026

No duty to count

The reason there is no total is partly that nobody has to report one. The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 will require covered critical infrastructure entities to report certain cybersecurity incidents to CISA within 72 hours. More than four years after it passed, the rule is still not in force. CISA sent a draft final rule for White House review on October 1, 2026, and the review “can take up to 90 days,” so the rule “would not be published until early next year,” lawyers at Covington wrote (Inside Privacy).

Even then, the law asks for incident reports, not cleanup costs, and it does not require anyone to publish them. A small water utility that discovers an intruder today is asked to report voluntarily. A utility that spends months rebuilding its network can keep the cost to itself.

ReportingInside Privacy (Covington), October 8, 2026AA24-038A, PDF

Still inside

The government has not said the problem is solved. In April 2026, an advisory released by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre with U.S. agencies and partners in Europe and Asia warned that covert networks of hijacked devices “have been used by Chinese state-sponsored actors Volt Typhoon to pre-position offensive cyber capabilities on critical national infrastructure” (AA26-113A).

At the December 2025 House hearing, a security official from the Idaho National Laboratory put it more starkly: “Through Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon [and] Flax Typhoon, the Chinese Communist Party has embedded itself in our energy communications and water systems” (Utility Dive).

Littleton rebuilt its network, was tested again by federal agencies, and passed. It is one small public utility, with a general manager willing to talk. The others, if there are 200 or more, have not said who found them, who paid to clean up, or how much. Until someone is required to count, the cost of five years inside will stay where it is now: on the balance sheets of the utilities, and in the end on the bills of the people they serve.

After 2024CISA and partners, advisory AA26-113A, April 2026Utility Dive, December 3, 2025

What is established, and what is not

Established

  • U.S. and allied agencies assess “with high confidence” that Volt Typhoon is pre-positioning in U.S. critical infrastructure networks. Government-attributed
  • In one confirmed water-sector case, intruders moved through the network over nine months and potentially had access to profiles for water treatment plants and an electrical substation.
  • Littleton Electric Light and Water Departments was compromised from February to December 2023 and rebuilt its network.
  • China denies the attribution and says the threat was invented to win U.S. funding.

Not established

  • How many organizations are compromised; the only number, 200 utilities, comes secondhand from Littleton’s general manager.
  • What any victim has spent on detection and cleanup.
  • Which federal grant paid for Littleton’s monitoring.
  • Whether any utility has recovered Volt Typhoon costs through its rates.
  • Whether the intruders are still inside networks the government knows about.

Sources

  1. Littleton, Massachusetts
    1. The Register, March 12, 2025
    2. The Record, March 12, 2025
    3. Dragos case study, March 2025
  2. The U.S. case
    1. CISA and partners, advisory AA24-038A
    2. AA24-038A, PDF
    3. Microsoft, May 24, 2023
    4. Easterly testimony, January 31, 2024
    5. Justice Department, January 31, 2024
    6. Same release, full text (GlobalSecurity)
  3. What is and is not documented
    1. AA24-038A, PDF
    2. The Record, March 12, 2025
    3. The Register, March 12, 2025
    4. Nextgov, October 28, 2026
  4. China’s response
    1. Foreign ministry press conference, April 15, 2024 (embassy transcript)
    2. China Daily, July 9, 2024
    3. The Record, July 10, 2024
    4. Foreign ministry, October 15, 2024
  5. Costs and funding
    1. Dragos case study (vendor document)
    2. American Public Power Association
    3. FERC Order No. 893, Federal Register, May 3, 2023
    4. Congressional Research Service, R48556
    5. Congressional Research Service, R48874
    6. FDD, October 5, 2026
    7. Utility Dive, December 3, 2025
    8. Federal News Network, January 20, 2026
    9. Senate Appropriations, FY2026 summary
    10. Montgomery testimony, April 29, 2026
  6. Reporting
    1. Inside Privacy (Covington), October 8, 2026
    2. AA24-038A, PDF
  7. After 2024
    1. CISA and partners, advisory AA26-113A, April 2026
    2. Utility Dive, December 3, 2025
For journalists and researchers

Key facts, citable

  1. AA24-038A: U.S. agencies observed indications of Volt Typhoon footholds in some victim IT environments for at least five years. Source
  2. A December 2023 court-authorized operation removed Volt Typhoon malware from hundreds of U.S.-based SOHO routers. Source
  3. Littleton Electric Light and Water Departments had Volt Typhoon in its systems from February 2023. Source
  4. FERC Order No. 893 allows certain cybersecurity costs to be included in transmission rate base as regulatory assets. Source
  5. CISA submitted the draft CIRCIA final rule for White House review on October 1, 2026. Source

Primary documents

Cite this

Researchez. “Five Years Inside: Who Pays to Find China’s Hackers in America’s Water and Power Networks.” Researchez, November 20, 2026. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-volt-typhoon-who-pays-cleanup.

Researchez. (2026, November 20). Five Years Inside: Who Pays to Find China’s Hackers in America’s Water and Power Networks. Researchez. https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-volt-typhoon-who-pays-cleanup

https://www.middleeastinfo.org/article-volt-typhoon-who-pays-cleanup

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